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Abstract
We investigate the topics of sensitivity and robustness
in feedforward and convolutional neural networks. Com-
bining energy landscape techniques developed in computa-
tional chemistry with tools drawn from formal methods, we
produce empirical evidence indicating that networks corre-
sponding to lower-lying minima in the optimization land-
scape of the learning objective tend to be more robust. The
robustness estimate used is the inverse of a proposed sen-
sitivity measure, which we define as the volume of an over-
approximation of the reachable set of network outputs under
all additive l∞-bounded perturbations on the input data.
We present a novel loss function which includes a sensi-
tivity term in addition to the traditional task-oriented and
regularization terms. In our experiments on standard ma-
chine learning and computer vision datasets, we show that
the proposed loss function leads to networks which reliably
optimize the robustness measure as well as other related
metrics of adversarial robustness without significant degra-
dation in the classification error. Experimental results indi-
cate that the proposed method outperforms state-of-the-art
sensitivity-based learning approaches with regards to ro-
bustness to adversarial attacks. We also show that although
the introduced framework does not explicitly enforce an ad-
versarial loss, it achieves competitive overall performance
relative to methods that do.
1. Introduction
The advent of machine learning techniques, most no-
tably deep learning [4], has made it possible to automate
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complex tasks such as vision-based object detection, nat-
ural language processing, machine translation, and stock-
market analysis. Despite its tremendous success in many
academic endeavors and commercial applications, the adop-
tion of deep learning in the perception, decision and control
loops of mission/safety-critical systems has been limited.
One possible reason for the slow rate of adoption is the
limited theoretical understanding of the inner workings of
deep neural networks (DNNs). Another possible reason is
the lack of guarantees of certain behavioral, and, in partic-
ular, robustness properties. One such robustness property is
the ability of the network to be resistant to adversarial at-
tacks. In an adversarial attack, the input data is perturbed
minimally such that, while the resulting adversarial exam-
ple closely resembles the unmolested sample, the output of
the trained network is affected. Recent work in the deep
learning literature [13, 28, 36, 22, 16, 34, 11] has shown
that DNNs may be susceptible to adversarial examples. For
state-of-art DNN image classifiers, researchers have con-
cocted methods to reliably engineer small perturbations that
result in successful adversarial examples. In one such ex-
ample [13], the generated adversarial example looks, to the
naked human eye, indistinguishable from the original sam-
ple, but produces a drastically different classifier output.
Some input perturbations are synthetic [13], while others
target physical, real-world objects [22, 11].
In traditional verification and validation (V&V) pro-
cesses for safety-critical systems, the robustness of the sys-
tem is assured via an extensive testing procedure which
samples the expected variations in the values of the param-
eters of the operating environment and system inputs until
certain criteria of appropriate coverage metrics are reached.
This test-based approach is likely to be less effective for sys-
tems with deep learning components since the dimensions
of their input spaces are typically much larger. Furthermore,
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the lack of understanding of the topology of the input spaces
involved leads to an open theoretical question: how do we
define covergence metrics for V&V tests applied to systems
with deep learning components? Nevertheless, we know
that it is feasible to provide formal guarantees of robustness
properties of small to medimum DNNs [18] as well as to
enforce the guarantee of a robustness property through the
training process for larger DNNs [21]. With the increase
in predictability that comes with the formal guarantees of
adversarial robustness, it is conceivable that deep learning
systems could be deployed in mission and/or safety-critical
systems.
In this paper, we present a new learning framework that
results in networks which are less sensitive to changes in
the input, and, consequently, likely to be more robust to ad-
versarial attacks. The method reliably yields networks of
increased robustness by introducing a cost term that penal-
izes output sensitivity to changes in the input.
The sensitivity measure is described briefly below and
is further detailed in Sec. 3. Consider a portion of a two-
dimensional output space illustrated in Fig. 1 (left) where
a segment of the decision boundary between classes C1
and C2 lies. The black dot represents the network out-
put for a sample x belonging to C1. Consider a set ∆
containing all possible perturbation vectors expected upon
network deployment. These could include, in the case of
a vision-based object classification application, synthetic
noise, physical perturbations, shadows, glare, etc. Consider
the input data x, and the set X resulting from perturbing
x with all possible disturbances from ∆. The DNN maps
the perturbed input set X into some output reachable set,
an over-approximation of which is represented by the box
in the figure. We measure the sensitivity of the network
as the aggregate volume of all over-approximations of the
output reachable set across the training samples for a prede-
termined ∆.
Also shown in Fig. 1 (left) is the region of potential
counter-examples (red portion of the box), which contains
all the points in the over-approximated output set for which
the classification changes from C1 to C2, i.e., potential out-
puts of adversarial inputs. We hypothesize that, by reducing
the volume of the output reachable set for some given per-
turbed input set, the possibility of successful adversarial in-
puts can be ameliorated, as indicated by the smaller orange
box in Fig. 1 (right).
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized
as follows:
• We propose a novel sensitivity metric for feedforward
neural networs and introduce two different approaches to
estimate it (see Sec. 3): one based on Reluplex [18], an
update on the classical Simplex method that enables sup-
port of ReLU constraints; and one based on evaluating
the dual cost of a Linear Programming (LP) relaxation
Figure 1: Reducing the size of the output reachable set
could lead to increased robustness to adversarial inputs
of the exact encoding of the input-output mapping of a
ReLU-based network [21, 9].
• We conduct an empirical study on the relationship be-
tween the sensitivities of neural networks and the en-
ergy values of their corresponding optimization land-
scape minima, from which we conclude that networks
corresponding to lower-lying minima tend to be less sen-
sitive than those corresponding to higher-valued minima.
We also show that traditional optimization approaches
based on Stochastic Gradient Descent (SGD) algorithms
and regularization do not necessarily lead to networks
with good sensitivity properties (see Sec. 4).
• Based on the above results, we propose a novel loss func-
tion which enables effective task-oriented learning while
penalizing high network sensitivity to changes in the in-
put (see Sec. 5). We empirically verify the effectiveness
of the proposed cost function, and compare the perfor-
mance of our method with that of state-of-art approaches
(see Sec. 6).
2. Background and Related Work
Many supervised machine and deep learning algorithms
operate based on the principle of Empirical Risk Minimiza-
tion (ERM), whereby the expectation of a loss function as-
sociated with a given hypothesis is approximated with its
empirical estimate. The main implication of this modus
operandi is the so-called Generalization Error (GE), which
refers to the difference between the empirical error and the
expected error; practically speaking, the GE manifests it-
self in a difference in algorithm performance on unseen data
relative to the performance observed on the training data.
Since ERM is an optimistically biased estimation process
[42], techniques to bridge (and understand) the gap between
the empirical risk and the true risk have been proposed: the
narrower the gap, the better the generalization properties of
the algorithm. Broadly speaking, these techniques fall un-
der one of the following categories:
2.1. Sensitivity and Robustness Analysis and Opti-
mization
The authors of [42] define robustness as the property of
a machine learning algorithm to produce similar test and
training errors when the test and training samples are sim-
ilar to each other, and hypothesize that a weak measure of
robustness is both sufficient and necessary for good gener-
alizability. Furthermore, they derive a generalization bound
that holds under certain constraints. The authors of [26]
conclude empirically that trained neural networks are more
robust to input perturbations in the vicinity of the training
manifold and that higher robustness correlates well with
good generalization properties. In [33], the relation be-
tween the GE and the classification margin of a neural net-
work is studied. The authors conclude that a necessary con-
dition for good generalization is for the Jacobian matrix of
the network to have a bounded spectral norm in the neigh-
borhood of the training samples, in line with the results pre-
sented in [26, 43, 17].
2.2. Robustness Against Adversarial Attacks
Adversarial examples are data samples constructed by
applying perturbations to known training samples along di-
rections that result in the largest change at the network out-
put [14], so that the perturbed input, often indistinguishable
from the original input, leads to an erroneous decision by
the network. This vulnerability is directly related to the GE
and can be ameliorated by training with adversarial exam-
ples [14]. The approach introduced in [15] aims at achiev-
ing robustness against adversarial attacks, and consists of
stacking a denoising auto encoder (DAE) with the network
of interest, the role of the DAE being to map back the ad-
versarial example to the training manifold. An alternative
architecture based on contractive auto encoders (CAE) is
also proposed. The authors of [21] propose a method to
train deep networks based on ReLU activation units that are
provably robust to adversarial attacks; they achieve this by
minimizing the worst-case loss across the a convex over-
approximation of the reachable set under norm-bounded in-
put perturbations.
2.3. Formal Verification of Neural Networks
Often, the GE includes behavior that is not only incor-
rect, but also unpredictable, which prevents deployment
of deep learning algorithms in safety-critical applications.
Formal verification refers to techniques aimed at provid-
ing mathematical guarantees about the behavior of sys-
tems including computer programs [29]. Formal verifi-
cation is used most often for safety-critical applications
in sectors such as aerospace, nuclear and rail. Early ap-
proaches to formally verifying neural networks leveraged
SMT solvers [30], but did not scale well and were practi-
cal on very small networks with a single hidden layer and
a small number of neurons. Reluplex [18] extended the
simplex algorithm to support the piece-wise linear nature
of ReLU activation units, and showed improved scalability
properties. More recently, authors have tackled the prob-
lem using optimization-based approaches including: Mixed
Integer Programming (MIP) formulations [6] with local
search [8], LP relaxation [10], branch and bound [10, 5],
and dual formulations [9, 21]. In contrast to most of the
other literature, the framework introduced in [9] applies to
a general class of activation functions.
2.4. Analysis of Optimization Landscapes
The training of modern machine learning models, most
notably of deep networks, is posed in the form of highly
non-convex optimization tasks with multiple local minima.
The simplest way to quantify the quality of landscape min-
ima is to measure their distance to the global minimum: the
closer the energy of a local minimum to that of the global
minimum, the better the quality of the minimum and its cor-
responding network. This definition is ill-posed as in gen-
eral the global minimum is not known for a typical nonlin-
ear optimization function. One of the dominant explana-
tions as to why deep learning works so well is that there
may be no bad minima at all for the loss functions of deep
network [2, 32, 25, 12, 35, 7]: under certain unrealistic as-
sumptions, it has been shown that all the local minima are
global minima [19]. In more realistic scenarios, cost func-
tions with a non-vanishing l2-regularization term have been
shown to have local minima which are not global minima
[23, 37]. Another branch of research leverages optimiza-
tion methods developed for chemical physics, called the
potential energy landscape theory [40]. Using such tech-
niques, the authors of [3] showed that the landscape of the
loss function for a specific feed-forward artificial neural net-
work with one hidden layer trained on the MNIST dataset
exhibited a single funnel structure. In a recent paper [24]
(see also, [41, 20]), the measure of the goodness of a mini-
mum is refined by adding further metrics in addition to the
value of the cost function or the performance. The work
concluded that when an overspecified artificial neural net-
work with one hidden layer and l2-regularization was used
to learn the exclusive OR (XOR) function, although the
classification error was often zero for various minima, the
sparsity structure of the network varied with the minima.
3. Measure of Robustness via Sensitivity Anal-
ysis
This section provides a detailed description of the sen-
sitivty measure overviewed in Sec. 1, as well as of the
methods that we use to estimate sensitivity for feedforward
neural networks with ReLU activation nodes under l∞-
norm bounded perturbations. Throughout the paper, we use
ReLU as the activation function. A feedforward neural net-
work is a parameterized function fW which maps input data
xi in Rn to output vectors yi in Rm. By applying l∞-norm
bounded perturbations to an input data vector xi, we obtain
a perturbed input set X = {x|x ∈ Rn, ‖x− xi‖∞ ≤ },
Figure 2: Proposed sensitivity measure is the volume of the
box over-approximation of the output polytope which re-
sults from l∞-norm bounded perturbations to the input.
where  denotes the perturbation bound. Given the per-
turbed input set X , the output reachable set of the network
is Y = {y ∈ Rm|y = fW (x) ∧ x ∈ X}. As stated earlier,
we use an estimate of the volume of Y as a surrogate met-
ric for network sensitivity. For feedforward networks with
ReLU activation nodes, Y is generally a non-convex poly-
tope whose exact volume is difficult to compute. Instead,
we define the sensitivity of the network as the volume of a
box over-approximation of the output reachable set as illus-
trated in Fig. 2. The over-approximation can be either tight
(green box with solid boundary in Fig. 2) or loose (red box
with dashed boundary in Fig. 2) depending on the compu-
tational methods used. There is a significant trade-off be-
tween the conservatism of the over-approximation and the
time it takes to compute it. We now describe the two meth-
ods used in our experiments. The first method, based on the
dual formulation, is used to compute a conservative (i.e.,
loose) over-approximation. This method turned out to be
efficient enough in practice to be incorporated in the train-
ing process described in Sec. 5. The second method uses
Reluplex, a SMT solver specialized for DNNs, to compute
a tight over-approximation of the output polytope.
3.1. Computing Sensitivity Using a Dual Formula-
tion
The volume of the tight over-approximation (green box
in Fig. 2) can be computed by finding the min and max
values along each dimension of the output vector and then
computing the product of the lengths of the resulting in-
tervals across all dimensions. Finding the min and max of
the output dimensions of a N -layer ReLU network requires
solving a set of difficult optimization problems i.e., mini-
mize and maximize y[i], i = 1, . . . ,m, where y[i] is the
i-th entry of the output vector y, subject to a set of piece-
wise linear constraints imposed by the ReLU activations.
The min of y[i] (denoted ymin[i]) under l∞-norm bounded
perturbations to input x with bound  is the solution of the
Figure 3: Linear relaxation of piece-wise linear constraints.
following set of optimization problems:
minimize y[i], i = 1, . . . ,m (1)
subject to x[j]−  ≤ xˆ[j] ≤ x[j] + , j = 1, . . . , n
(2)
z1 = W0xˆ+ b0 (3)
y = WNzN + bN
zk+1 = max (0,Wkzk + bk), k = 1, . . . , N − 1
(4)
whereN is the number of layers in the network, andWk and
bk are the weights and biases between layers k and k + 1,
respectively. The constraints in Eq. 2 capture the fact that
the input belongs to the perturbed set X . The piece-wise
linear constraints in Eq. 4 denote the relations between the
inputs and outputs of the layers with ReLU activations. The
max of y[i] (denoted ymax[i]) is just the negative of the min
of−y[i] in Eq. 1. The volume of the over-approximation is:
Πmi=1ymax[i]− ymin[i] (5)
It is known within the operational research community
that the optimization problem in 1 can be transformed
into a mixed-integer linear programming (MILP) problem
through the usage of the big-M trick [31]. Therefore com-
puting the sensitivity of a network can be done by solving a
MILP using a state-of-art solver such as Gurobi [27] or by
using other techniques with exact encodings benchmarked
in recent work [5]. However, it remains difficult to scale up
the “exact” methods to efficiently verify sensitivity of net-
works with multiple fully-connected layers and more than
hundreds of ReLU nodes.
Due to the associated computational complexity, using
methods with exact encodings is not yet practical for our
main goal, which is to incorporate the sensitivity measure
into the loss function driving the learning. Instead, we adopt
an approach inspired by recent work in which ReLU con-
straints are relaxed into a set of linear constraints. The re-
laxation is illustrated graphically in Fig. 3. Consider the
piece-wise linear constraints zi+1 = max (0,Wizi + bi)
from Eq. 4; under the relaxation procedure, they are trans-
formed into a set of linear constraints:
zi+1 ≤Mzi + di
li ≤ zi ≤ ui
zi+1 ≥ zi
zi+1 ≥ 0
(6)
With the linear constraints in Eq. 6, the optimization task in
Eq. 1 is transformed into a primal linear programming (LP)
problem. Furthermore, the dual objective, when evaluated
at any feasible point, becomes a lower-bound to the primal
objective. As noted in [21], there is a feasible point which
can guarantee in practice a “sufficiently tight enough” lower
bound to the primal objective.
Let J(x,C, , ν;W ) be the dual objective function
from [21], where x is the input data, C is the primal objec-
tive matrix,  is the l∞ norm bound of the allowable input
perturbations, ν is the dual variable, and W represents the
network parameters; the sensitivity function S(x, , ν;W ),
which measures the sensitivity of a neural network under
norm-bounded perturbations, is given by:
S(x, , ν;W ) =
m∏
j=1
−J(x,−Im×m, , ν;W )[j]
−J(x, Im×m, , ν;W )[j]
(7)
where Im×m ∈ Rm×m is the identity matrix. Eq. 7 is the
volume of a (box) over-approximation of the output reach-
able set of a feed-forward neural network with ReLU ac-
tivation nodes under l∞-norm bounded perturbations with
bound .
The sensitivity function can be evaluated very efficiently
on a GPU-enabled laptop with CUDA for networks with
multiple layers, and up to a few thousand nodes. Compara-
tively, the sensitivity of a similar-sized network when eval-
uated with an “exact method” such as Reluplex can take
hours to compute. However, this computational speed ad-
vantage comes at the cost of over-estimation of the sensitiv-
ity measure, as both the linear relaxation in Eq. 6 and the
evaluation of the dual objective at a feasible point adds to
the conservatism of the (box) over-approximation.
3.2. Computing Sensitivity Using Reluplex
As mentioned in Sec. 3.1, several “exact” techniques
benchmarked in [5] can be used to compute the volume of
the tight over-approximation. In the experiments of Sec. 4,
we used Reluplex as the solver. To compute the volume
of the tight (box) over-approximation, we queried Reluplex
the following satisfiability problem: for a given data input x
and perturbation bound , does there exist a solution y that
satisfies the set of constraints
y[i] <= a[i] ∧ y[i] >= b[i], i = 1, . . . ,m (8)
and Eqs. 2, 3 and 4 in which a[i] ∈ R and b[i] ∈ R are
respectively the candidate min and max of y[i]. If Relu-
plex returns a negative answer, then a[i] and b[i] are valid
lower and upper bounds to y[i]. Reluplex is queried repeat-
edly with a sequence of min and max candidates {a[i]j}
and {b[i]j} until a numerical tolerance is reached. We im-
plemented a simple bisection algorithm to generate a se-
quence of min and max candidates {a[i]j} and {b[i]j}, and a
translational tool-chain to repeatedly query Reluplex. Fig. 4
plots Sdual−SReluplexSReluplex for close to 200 networks (each cor-
responding to different landscape minima) in which Sdual
is the sensitivity computed using the dual formulation and
SReluplex is the sensitivity computed by Reluplex on the
same network with the same input perturbation bound. The
large peak around network #50 shows that the dual of LP
technique can occasionally over-estimate the sensitivity of
a network by a large amount when compared against Relu-
plex, but the plot also shows that for the majority of the net-
works the over-estimation remains relatively insignificant.
Figure 4: Relative difference between sensitivity estimation
via the Dual Formulation and Reluplex.
4. Optimization Landscape Minima: Energy
Value vs. Sensitivity
In this section, we investigate the quality of the different
minima in the optimization landscape of neural networks by
leveraging a combination of energy landscape approaches
developed by chemical physicists, and the formal verifica-
tion tool Reluplex developed by the computer scientists.
4.1. Computing the Minima
To find multiple minima, we use methods devel-
oped in computational chemistry to explore energy land-
scapes of atomic and molecular clusters, as described
in [39]. First, using different quasi-Newton methods such
as limited memory Broyden-Fletcher-Goldfarb-Shanno (L-
BFGS) and basin-hopping methods starting from differ-
ent random initial guesses, we find multiple local min-
ima. Next, an eigen-vector following method is used to
find multiple saddle points of index 1 again by feeding
different random initial guesses and following the search
in the restricted directions where the Hessian matrix has
exactly one negative eigenvalue. Then, from each saddle
point of index 1, we compute two steepest descent paths in
two different directions to connect the corresponding pair
of minima. While following this process of connecting
pairs of minima, whenever any of the two end-points of
this path is not in the existing database of the minima, it
gets added to the database. This process is iterated a few
times to obtain multiple minima, while retaining only en-
ergetically distinct minima (minima which are at different
geometrical locations but have the same energy value are
discrete-symmetrically related with each other and can be
obtained via a discrete transformation of weights). To run
these computations, we use a wrapper around Python En-
ergy Landscape Explorer (PELE) [1], which performs en-
ergy landscape related computations (i.e., all the aforemen-
tioned steps) for any given unconstrained multivariate cost
function with continuous variables, as well as Theano [38],
which computes the cost function values for the given neu-
ral network architecture. To circumvent the discontinuities
associated with the ReLU activation functions, we take a
constant value whenever the Hessian is singular by using
Theano’s built-in gradients libraries. For the Iris data, we
fix the l2 regularization parameter to 0.001. Since this is a
stochastic method, there is no guarantee that all minima will
be found. We only sample the minima to obtain a qualitative
picture.
4.2. Iris Results and Discussion
The network architecture selected to tackle classification
on the Iris dataset consists of 3 fully-connected hidden lay-
ers of 25 neurons each. We used the energy landscape meth-
ods described in Sec. 4.1 to obtain 763 Iris minima of vary-
ing energy values. The computation took a total of 20 hours
on a standard laptop with a single CPU and 8GB of memory.
We measure the sensitivity of each of the networks cor-
responding to these minima by assuming a vector of pertur-
bation bounds v = σdˆ where σ = 0.05, 0.1, 0.2, where dˆ
is a vector containing the ranges of values of features of the
entire Iris dataset; that is, the perturbation bound for each
input dimension is proportional to the spread of the input
data along that dimension. Given a fixed v and an input
data point x, we queried Reluplex iteratively, as described
in Sec. 3.2, until convergence to the min and max of each
output dimension y[i], i = 1, 2, 3 is achieved up to some
numerical tolerance. The sensitivity of the network output
is plotted as a function of the energy value of the landscape
minima for σ = 10% in Fig. 5. It can be seen that there
is a tendency for networks corresponding to lower energy
minima to have lower sensitivity and hence possibly exhibit
Figure 5: Network sensitivity vs. network energy for Iris
landscape
more robustness to norm-bounded input perturbations. The
plot illustrates the behavior of the average sensitivity for 30
samples and for all samples (150) of the Iris dataset.
5. Learning with Sensitivity Minimization
Having shown empirically that low-lying landscape min-
ima lead to networks that are less sensitive than networks
with higher energy, we now describe a new training method
that encourages convergence to networks with reduced sen-
sivitiy. First, we point out that the traditional task-centric
loss function (e.g., cross-entropy) plus an l2-regularization
term does not necessarilty guarantee convergence to net-
work with reduced sensitivity. Fig. 6 shows example train-
ing runs done on the Iris dataset. The y-axis is the sensitiv-
ity of the network, and x-axis is the training epoch. It can
be seen that the change in sensivitiy is irregular and without
any clear pattern or trend.
Figure 6: Samples of training runs with undesired evolution
of network sensitivity.
The proposed learning framework, which aims to mini-
mize the sensitivity of its output networks, is illustrated in
Fig. 7. The main idea of the proposed framework is to aug-
Figure 7: Proposed training method to reduce network sen-
sitivity.
ment the usual loss function L with an additional weighted
term λS(xi, , ν;W ) in which the multiplier λ > 0 is a new
hyperparameter, and S(xi, , ν;W ) is the sensitivity func-
tion from 7. Let L(xi, yi;W ) be the usual loss function
with regularization incorporated. Given training sets of size
M , the optimization task is to find the following minimizer:
W ∗ = argmin
W
1
M
M∑
i=1
L(xi, yi;W ) + λS(xi, , ν;W )
(9)
To evaluate the sensitivity function S during training, any
feasible values for the dual variables ν can be used. The
optimality of ν affects how conservative the estimated sen-
sitivity will be. For the experiments in the next section, we
evaluate S using Algorithm 1 from [21].
6. Experimental Results
In this section, we present two sets of experimental re-
sults comparing the performance of our training technique
across several metrics against other state-of-art techniques
in the literature. The standard handwritten digits data-set
MNIST is used in all experiments. The baseline training
for all comparisons consists of a cross-entropy loss function
with l2 regularization.
In the first set of experiments, we compare our our sensi-
tivity minimization (SM) algorithm against two other tech-
niques which, like the proposed approach, minimize some
measure of sensitivity. The first technique [17] (jacobM)
performs regularization on the Frobeonius norm of the lo-
cal Jacobian matrix of the network’s classification function,
while the second method [43] (specM) implements a reg-
ularization scheme on the spectral norm of the network
weights. The results from the first set of experiments are
discussed in Sec. 6.1.
The second set of experiments aims at demonstrating
that some improvement in performance against adversar-
ial attacks results as a side consequence of sensitivity min-
imization. To that end, we compare SM against the de-
scribed baseline approach as well as the algorithm from [21]
(K&W), which maximizes an adversarial robustness mea-
sure explicitly. The results of these experiments are dis-
cussed in Sec. 6.2.
In both experiments, the weight on our sensitivity loss
was chosen to be λ = 1×10−6. This value was empirically
optimized based on multiple training runs and provides a
good balance between the classification performance and
sensitivity of the resulting network. A perturbation bound
as described in Sec. 4 with σ = 0.05 was chosen for all
evaluations of sensitivity and adversarial robustness. One
training instance with identical sets of mini-batches is ex-
ecuted for each method being tested, and each resulting
trained network is evaluated across all metrics under con-
sideration. Performance is measured on both the training
and test data. The standard MNIST training and test sets
are used throughout.
6.1. Experiments on Sensitivity-Based Optimiza-
tion
The network architecture consists of two convolutional
layers and one fully-connected layer. We use the Adam
Optimizer. As stated, the competing training techniques
are applied on identical sets of mini-batches. The set of
training techniques include SM, specM, jacobM, as well as
the baseline. The metrics used to evaluate performance are
cross-entropy loss (CE), classification error (ERR), our own
sensitivity measure from Eq. 9 (SENSE), the Jacobian loss
from [17] (JACOB), the Spectral loss from [43] (SPEC-
TRAL), and K&W’s [21] adversarial loss (ADV LOSS)
and (ADV ERR) (i.e., the percentage of the input data for
which the application of bounded perturbations could lead
to adversarial examples).
The metric values (after convergence) for each of the
techniques are listed in Table 1. Top performers are high-
lighted (dark green), as well as second-best performers that
are closer to the top performer than to the bottom performer
(lime green). The plots of the evolutions of the metrics
through the training process are provided in the appendix.
When compared to the baseline, the results show that the
spectral regularization technique has very small impact on
the adversarial loss and little to no effect on the adversar-
ial error. Jacobian loss regularization performed better than
spectral regularization in terms of those robustness mea-
sures; however it still lags behind our sensitivity minimiza-
tion technique in terms of guaranteeing robustness to ad-
versarial samples. Any increase in robustness once again
Table 1: Performance results on MNIST test data (sensitiv-
ity metrics - smaller is better).
Method/Metric CE ERR ADV LOSS ADV ERR
Base 0.033 0.92% 12.12 96.55%
specM 0.034 0.95% 10.31 97.53%
jacobM 0.155 2.74% 2.34 71.73%
SM 0.079 2.26% 0.41 12.62%
Method/Metric SENSE JACOB SPECTRAL
Base. 4.58× 1012 17.47 7.19
specM 71.1× 1012 12.49 4.17
jacobM 44.5× 106 2.75 5.07
SM 5.53× 103 7.75 6.83
Table 2: Performance results on MNIST training data (ad-
versarial metrics - smaller is better)
T/M CE ERR SENSE ADV LOSS ADV ERR
Base. 0.071 1.94% 1.28× 1012 6.25 91.98%
K&W 0.285 8.02% 2.0× 105 0.55 16.02%
SM 0.138 3.56% 8.76× 103 0.85 26.36%
comes at the cost of classification performance as both ja-
cobM and SM are behind specM and the baseline in that re-
gard. Our method handily outperforms all competing meth-
ods on the adversarial-related metrics.
In terms of the sensitivity measures (i.e., SENSE, JA-
COB and SPECTRAL), each training method is the best
at minimizing its own metric. Regarding the cross-
regularizations performance, jacobM outperformed specM
by many orders of magnitude at minimizing our sensitivity
measure. It is also better than our technique at minimizing
the spectral norm. Our technique did perform better than
specM at minimizing the Jacobian loss.
6.2. Experiments on Adversarial-Margin-Based
Optimization
For the comparison between baseline, SM and K&W, we
use a network architecture consisting of one convolutional
layer and one fully-connected layer. For this experiment, we
used a vanilla stochastic gradient descent (SGD) optimizer
without additional heuristics. We compare performance on
CE, ERR, SENSE, ADV LOSS and ADV ERR.
The final performance numbers for the training and test
data are listed in Tables 2 and 3. For more detailed compar-
isons of how the performance of the techniques on a partic-
ular metric evolved through the course of the training, see
figures in the appendix.
Our technique outperforms both the baseline and K&W
on the sensitivity measure. In terms of the adversarial error,
our technique was outperformed by K&W; however, when
compared against the baseline, both methods increase the
robustness of the network by significant margins. Clearly,
there is a correlation between the lower sensitivities and
Table 3: Performance results on MNIST test data (adversar-
ial metrics - smaller is better)
T/M CE ERR SENSE ADV LOSS ADV ERR
Base 0.082 2.38% 1.27× 1012 6.11 91.23%
K&W 0.262 7.3% 2.12× 105 0.51 14.54%
SM 0.125 3.25% 8.65× 103 0.79 24.5%
lower adversarial loss/error. While our technique does not
minimize the adversarial error directly, the empirical out-
come indicated in Table 2 seems to indicate that encourag-
ing small sensitivity has an effect on that measure. Comple-
mentarily, the method from [21] directly minimizes the ad-
versarial error by maximizing the adversarial margin; how-
ever, as shown in Table 2, it appears to also have signif-
icant effect towards minimizing the sensitivity of the net-
work when compared against the baseline.
In terms of classification error and cross-entropy loss, the
performance of our training method exceeds that of K&W.
We believe this difference in classification performance is
due to overfitting in K&W taking place. This could be due
to the fact that K&W learns boundaries based on worst-
case adversarial examples, which may lead to unnecessar-
ily uneven boundaries, often associated with overfitting; in
contrast, our training method reduces the size of the output
reachable set uniformly, and not based on any individual
sample. The significant gains in classification performance
and sensitivity on both training and test sets of our method
relative to K&W, more than make up for the comparatively
slight loss in adversarial performance.
7. Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we studied the relationship between the en-
ergy value of optimization landscape minima and the sensi-
tivity and adversarial robustness of the resulting networks.
Using formal verification and energy landscape techniques,
we empirically showed that there exists a correlation be-
tween the sensitivity of a network and the energy value of
its corresponding landscape minimum: the lower the energy
of the minimum, the less sensitive the network is to pertur-
bations in the input. We also studied the relationship be-
tween the sensitivity of a neural network and its adversarial
robustness, and show that less sensitive networks tend to be
more robust. Furthermore, we found that there is a consis-
tent trade-off between adversarial and sensitivity properties
of a network and its classification performance.
Leveraging those experimental findings, we introduced a
novel learning framework aimed at optimizing the sensitiv-
ity of a network, as measured by the aggregate volume of an
over-approximation of the reachable set of network outputs
under bounded additive perturbations. We showed exper-
imentally that, as expected, the proposed sensitivity-based
learning approach had positive impact on the adversarial ro-
bustness of the resulting networks. Overall, we found that
the proposed method compares favorably against state-of-
the-art sensitivity-based learning frameworks with regards
to adversarial robustness, while at the same time remaining
competitive across miscellaneous sensitivity metrics.
An additional set of experiments comparing the perfor-
mance of the proposed network and an adversarially-tuned
state-of-the-art approach showed that application of our
method results in a reasonable trade-off between sensitiv-
ity, adversarial robustness and classification performance.
While the proposed method slightly lagged behind in terms
of the computed adversarial metrics, we believe the ob-
served sensitivity gains and ameliorated losses in classifi-
cation performance represent a more than sensible compro-
mise which may be preferred in certain applications.
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A. Appendix - Section 6: Experimental Results
The plots included in this appendix illustrate the evolution of the different losses through the training process of the
methods being compared.
A.1. Experiments on Sensitivity-Based Optimization (Sec. 6.1)
Note that the shifts in behavior observed in the plots describing the evolution of jacobM [17] are due to the fact that the
method consists of three separate training stages: between epochs 1 and 41, it is equivalent to the baseline method; between
epochs 41 and 59, it incorporates dropout on top of the baseline approach; lastly, from epoch 61 on, it enforces the Jacobian
loss term.
(a) Cross-Entropy Loss on Validation Data (b) Classification Error on Validation Data
Figure 8: Performance Comparison - Performance Metrics
Figure 9: Sensitivity on Validation Data
(a) Jacobian Loss on Validation Data (b) Spectral Loss on Validation Data
Figure 10: Performance Comparison - Other Sensitivity Metrics
(a) Adversarial Loss on Validation Data (b) Adversarial Error on Validation Data
Figure 11: Performance Comparison - Adversarial Metrics
A.2. Experiments on Adversarial-Margin-Based Optimization (Sec. 6.2)
Note that the granularity of all training data plots is 250 mini-batches.
(a) Cross-Entropy Loss on Training Data (b) Cross-Entropy Loss on Validation Data
Figure 12: Performance Comparison - Cross-Entropy Loss
(a) Classification Error on Training Data (b) Classification Error on Validation Data
Figure 13: Performance Comparison - Classification Error Rate
(a) Sensitivity on Training Data (b) Sensitivity on Validation Data
Figure 14: Performance Comparison - Sensitivity
(a) Adversarial Loss on Training Data (b) Adversarial Loss on Validation Data
Figure 15: Performance Comparison - Adversarial Loss
(a) Adversarial Error Rate on Training Data (b) Adversarial Error Rate on Validation Data
Figure 16: Performance Comparison - Adversarial Error Rate
